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Design issues in bonus contracts  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Bonus plans have become a popular tool for compensating managers and employees. 
While other accounting studies on bonus plans typically focus on earnings management, 
for example by examining the association between cash bonuses and stock returns or the 
incentive for management to manage earnings, our study discusses specific issues that are 
relevant in designing and understanding bonus plans based on financial performance 
measures. 
 
Bonus contracts should be designed so they align the interest of management and owners. 
In practice, this is far more difficult than it sounds. We discuss issues that require special 
attention in preparing bonus contracts: Choice of performance measure(s), accounting 
issues, link between performance and bonus, and bonus threshold.  
 
Our study should be of interest to managers, compensation committees, investors and 
others interested in bonus plans. A proper bonus plan is essential to ascertain that 
management compensation is closely linked to management’s ability to create value.  
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1. Introduction 
Executive compensation based on performance measures (e.g., earnings, EVA) or share 
based compensation (stock options, warrants) has been a topic of considerable 
controversy in the academic and business communities for a number of years.  
While executive compensation is often based on stock options and warrants, they require 
that market data (i.e., stock prices and stock returns) are available1. However, the 
majority of firms within the EU are non-listed. For instance, only about 200 Danish 
companies are listed on the OMX (formerly known as the Copenhagen Stock Exchange), 
while the number of active public limited and private limited companies in Denmark 
amount to 78,825 in 2004 according to Danmarks Statistik (Danmarks Statistik: General 
Firm Statistics 2006). Since market data (stock prices) are not available for the majority 
of Danish firms, executive compensation must be based on financial and/or non-financial 
measures. Among the 1,865 Danish firms with more than 50 employees and a turnover in 
excess of 50 million DKK more than half of them provide top management with a bonus 
plan (Greens, 2003)2. The size of the bonus varies, but for 35% of the manager’s bonus 
equals at least 40% of the base salary (Greens, 2003). Since financial measures (e.g., 
earnings) intend to capture a firm’s underlying performance, compensation is often based 
on such measures. We focus entirely on financial measures, but many of our 
considerations are applicable to non financial measures as well. 
We discuss four major issues in designing accounting bonus contracts, which bonus 
committees and executives should consider: (1) choice of performance measure(s), (2) 
accounting issues, (3) the relation between bonus and performance measures, and (4) 
performance standards (bonus threshold). We consider one period performance measures 
only, as those are the ones used primarily in practice. In most cases, we do not provide 
solutions to the design issues, as these issues are often case specific making it impossible 
to generalise.      
Our paper should be of interest to anybody involved in accounting based bonus contracts 
including advisors (e.g., attorneys and auditors), bonus committees, investors and 
executives (managers and other key personnel). It is our intention to pinpoint major 
problems that parties involved in designing bonus contracts may use as a checklist when 
writing bonus contracts. 
 
2. Design issues in bonus contracts 
 
Bonus committees should align shareholders and managements interests. Accounting 
based performance measures should support corporate strategy in order to maximize 
shareholder value and, thus, reflect (true) economic income.  
 
According to extant literature executive bonus plans can be categorized in three basic 
components: choice of performance measure(s), the relation between pay (compensation) 
and performance and the choice of performance standards (see for example Murphy, 
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2001).  We devote special attention to accounting issues embedded in the three basic 
components of a bonus contract. Thus, we add accounting issues as a separate component 
leaving us with a discussion of these four components: 
 
• Choice of performance measure(s)  
a. Does it support the firm’s strategy? 
b. Should bonus be based on reported figures (e.g., annual report) or adjusted 
figures (internal report)? 
c. How should events that management cannot control affect bonus? 
d. How can it be avoided that management focus on short term performance 
(horizon problem)? 
• Accounting issues 
a. How should changes in accounting practices affect bonus? 
b. What are the pros and cons of different accounting measures of 
performance? 
• Relation between performance and bonus 
a. Should bonus be linearly tied to performance or paid as a lump sum? 
b. Should the size of bonus have a minimum and a maximum (floor-caps)?  
• Performance standards (bonus threshold) 
a. What should be the threshold (benchmark) for bonus? 
 
These issues are discussed in turn. 
 
 
3. Choice of performance measure(s) 
 
The fundamental idea behind granting bonus is to align the interests of management 
(agent) and the owners (principal). Bonus contracts should help ensure that management 
act in accordance with the selected strategy in order to maximise long term value 
creation. Choice of performance measure is critical since it has been empirically shown 
that ‘you get what you measure and reward’ (Wallace, 1996) that is managers take 
actions consistent with incentives from those performance measures.  
 
In practice bonus to management may be based on a variety of financial measures. 
Banghøj (2006) examines which financial measures are most frequently used by Danish 
listed firms. The results are shown in figure 1: 
 
Rank by frequency of use of financial performance measures   
(1 = Most frequently used, 4 = Least frequently used) 
 
  
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 1 
Turnover 2 
Contribution margin 2 
Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) 2 
Cash flows 2 
Earnings after taxes (net income) 3 
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Economic value added (EVA) 3 
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 4 
Cost reductions 4 
Return on equity 4 
Return on invested capital 4 
Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) 4 
 
Figure 1: Financial and non financial measures in Danish listed companies used to    
determine bonuses 2001 (Banghøj, 2006)3
 
It is evident from figure 1 that accounting based measures including ‘turnover’, ‘earnings 
from operations’ (EBIT, contribution margin, NOPAT etc.), and ‘net income’ are among 
the most popular financial measures used in bonus contracts. If a firm’s objective is to 
maximize shareholders wealth, the chosen earnings measure should reflect this. That is, 
there should be a clear correlation between the earnings measure and firm value.  
 
If bonus is based on reported figures (and details about bonus contracts are properly 
disclosed), financial statement users (e.g., investors) are provided with relevant 
information in regard to bonus contracts. This ensures transparency. However, since 
reported figures may be a noisy measure of the true underlying performance due to 
earnings management and/or the inclusion of ‘special items’, ‘transitory items’ and the 
like it may be argued that reported figures should be properly adjusted to better reflect the 
‘true’ performance (internal performance measure). This, again, raises some questions of 
concern. For instance, which adjustments should be considered? Could it be that the 
items that should be adjusted for varies over time? This issue is further addressed in 
section 3 ‘Accounting issues’. 
 
Management should be awarded bonus to the extent that they act in the interest of the 
owners; i.e. create value. An important premise is that there is a strict link between 
management’s efforts and the performance measure bonus is based on. Put differently, 
management should be rewarded only to the extent that they have an impact on firm 
performance. However, a variety of events cannot be ‘controlled’ by management. 
Terror, earth quakes, tax rates, interest rates, political inference etc. are just a few 
examples. A case in point is interest rates that are dependent upon a number of 
macroeconomic factors that management cannot control. For highly leveraged firms, 
earnings may fluctuate substantially, when market rates of interest fluctuate. This leaves 
the obvious questions: How can this be controlled for in the bonus contract? Who decides 
which events are uncontrollable by management? Is it possible at all to separate the 
(economic) effects from such events? These, and similar, open questions indicate that the 
effects of ‘uncontrollable events’ on bonus should be decided by the compensation 
committee on a case by case basis.  
 
Finally, warnings-based performance measures may provide management with incentives 
to focus on short-term performance, which Smith and Watts (1982) and Dechow and 
Sloan (1991) define as the ‘horizon problem’. The horizon issue is especially problematic 
if management is close to retirement or plan to quit. Management, close to retiring or 
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leaving office, may focus on short term earnings by for example postponing investments 
in R&D and marketing and avoiding restructuring plans that affect current year’s 
earnings negatively, but has a positive effect on earnings in future years. Thus, by 
initiating restructuring, executives may be punished (net earnings are lower) even though 
restructuring is (presumable) sound from an economic point of view.  
 
To avoid that management focuses on short term profit, one periodic performance 
measure (e.g., net earnings) might be replaced by a multiple periodic (financial) measure.  
The use of a bonus bank may also mitigate the horizon problem. Finally, the bonus 
contract may include several performance measures and/or non-financial measures.  
 
 
4. Accounting issues 
 
How should changes in accounting practices affect bonus  
Changes in accounting practices may take place for several reasons. The question is how 
such changes should be accounted for in bonus contracts. We address two types of 
changes: mandatory changes and voluntary changes.    
 
Financial statement information shall contain relevant and reliable information and give a 
‘true-and-fair-view’ of a firm’s earnings and financial position. This leaves room for 
management’s discretion. Voluntary changes in accounting practices (e.g., change in its 
income recognition policy from point of sale to percentage of completion method) may 
have a significant effect on the reported numbers. Ideally, voluntary changes should not 
affect bonuses, as it distorts the measurement of the ‘true’ underlying performance of the 
firm. At the least, the bonus contract should include clauses that describe how voluntary 
changes should be accounted for.   
 
A prominent example of mandatory changes in accounting practices is that all listed 
companies within the EU must comply with the international accounting standards 
(IAS/IFRS) as of January 1, 2005. Changing from local regulation (e.g., Danish GAAP) 
to international standards had in many cases significant effect on reported earnings. For 
instance, as a result of the change from amortizing goodwill over its useful lifetime to an 
impairment test only approach several listed companies on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange improved earnings by 400 – 500 million DKK. As with voluntary changes 
mandatory changes should not affect bonuses. 
 
What are the pros and cons of different accounting measures of performance  
Financial measures include a variety of earnings measures from the top line (turnover) to 
the bottom line (net income). As many different accounting performance measures are 
used in compensation contracts (as seen in figure 1), we discuss pros and cons of 
commonly used performance measures: turnover, EBIT, net earnings and EVA. We 
hypothesize that these performance measures are used widely, also by non-listed 
companies.  
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Net turnover 
If growth is desired for instance because the firm wants to penetrate new markets, 
turnover might be a relevant performance measure (i.e. management is rewarded based 
on growth in turnover). The advantage of this measure is that it is unaffected by 
accounting policies4. Thus, earnings management is not an issue. On the other hand, 
turnover does not account for costs and invested capital. For instance, by acquiring a new 
company turnover will increase ‘automatically’, when the two companies merge.  
 
Another accounting issue is whether management should be rewarded (punished) for a 
favourable (unfavourable) development in the exchange rate. Changes in the exchange 
rate might affect turnover significantly. A case in point is Novo Nordisk. In its annual 
report for 2000 (page 5) Novo states that: ’….a favourable development in the exchange 
rate contributed to sales growth by 11 percentage points.’ 
 
EBIT 
EBIT is a highly relevant performance measure, as it measures the outcome of the core 
business (before tax) regardless of how the company has financed its activities. However, 
it raises several issues including (but not limited to): 
 
• Should R&D and other forward looking costs (e.g., marketing costs) be expensed 
or capitalized? 
• How should transitory items be accounted for? 
• How should changes in accounting estimates affect compensation? 
 
It is paramount for biotech and high tech firms to invest in R&D to become commercially 
successful. For those firms recognition of investments in R&D as expenses may make it 
difficult for management to achieve bonus especially for new firms if bonus is based on 
earnings measures like EBIT.    
 
A further complication is the fact that EBIT does only partially account for investments 
(e.g., depreciation and amortisation are expensed). For instance, EBIT growth may be 
obtained simple by raising additional share capital and investing the proceeds in assets 
(e.g., bank deposit) even though this operation may destroy value (negative NPV).  
 
Examples of elements, which are often labelled ‘special items’, ‘transitory items’ or the 
like include gains and losses from disposal of assets, restructuring charges, discontinued 
activities etc. The treatment of those items raises at least two questions in relation to 
compensation: 
1. Should transitory items affect compensation?  
2. Who decides what is considered a transitory item?  
 
These issues are discussed below. 
 
(1) Should transitory items be included in performance measures? 
Bonuses based on various earnings measures give management an incentive to 
manipulate accounting principles and estimates in order to increase bonuses. 
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Management may thus be tempted to write-off large amounts on assets in periods, where 
they will not be able to meet bonus targets. In that case expenses are charged to current 
year’s income, while making it easier to reach targets in the coming years. Obviously, 
earnings measures should rely on the same accounting principles and estimates over time. 
 
If management are paid a cash bonus based on operating measures (e.g., EBIT), it might 
be argued that ‘special items’ should be expensed at least to the extent they are related to 
core operations. For example, restructuring or reorganising a firm to better meet the 
challenge of changing market conditions is clearly an ongoing part of running a business. 
However, as the following examples illustrates, there is a need to consider these items on 
a case by case basis.  
 
Example 1: Transitory item should be included in performance measure  
A Group has sold its packaging division after an attractive offer from a competitor. The 
accounting profit amounts to 250 million DKK. Board (and management) find that they 
have made an excellent deal, as they believe that they will never be able to get a 
satisfactory return (as measured by WACC) on the sales price. The board estimates that 
the transaction has improved the value of the firm by 100 million DKK.  The question is 
whether the 250 million DKK should be recognized in the accounting measure that bonus 
is based on. There is no doubt that the accounting profit of 250 million DKK. is a 
transitory item. At the same time investors’ real profit is less than 250 million DKK (100 
million DKK.). Management has created value for the investors by selling off the 
packaging division.  
 
This ought to be reflected in the earnings measure that bonus is based on, which stresses 
that the profit from disposing off packaging division should be recognized. Alternatively, 
managements might be awarded a separate bonus for divestment of the packaging 
division.   
 
Example 2: Transitory item should not be included in performance measure 
There are, however, also transitory accounting items that should not be included in EBIT,   
as shown in the following example. A paint producer has just closed down a production 
line an experienced an accounting loss of 25 million DKK.  However, due to assumed 
cost savings of 15 million DKK. per year for the next10 years the total effect is a positive 
NPV of  67 million DKK (assuming a WACC of 10%). If management do not close 
down the production line, the owners will forego a profit of 37 million DKK.  
 
The issue here is also a horizon problem – management should act as to secure long term 
profitability of the firm. This can be obtained by measuring EBIT exclusive of  transitory 
items that have an effect on future years performance (EBIT). Another way to mitigate 
the horizon problem would be to award management a separate bonus based on the 
expected profit from closing down the production line. Finally, the horizon problem may 
be overcome by using multi period performance measures. 
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(2) Who decides if an item is transitory 
A further complication is the question of who eventually decides if an item is ‘transitory’ 
or ‘permanent’ – the bonus committee or management. A solution to this problem may be 
to specifically list every transitory item in the bonus contract. However, it seems a 
daunting task to imagine every possible transaction that might be characterised as a 
transitory item. Deciding what constitutes a transitory item on a case by case basis is an 
alternative solution. This solution is also problematic for a number of reasons. For 
example, it’s bureaucratic since it (potentially) leaves the bonus committee and 
management with an ongoing discussion of which items are truly transitory. Thus, it is 
difficult to provide a general recommendation. 
 
Net earnings
Net earnings as a performance measure has the advantage that it captures all income and 
expenses no matter how these items are classified in the income statement. Nonetheless, 
it raises the same concerns as listed under EBIT. In addition, the effects of capital 
structure and taxes come into play. A firm may often have a politic of a certain capital 
structure leaving little discretion to management. On the other hand, if the capital 
structure is changed by issuing new capital and repaying interest bearing debt, earnings 
increase (cost of capital to the owners is not an expense in the income statement). Should 
this increase in earnings affect bonus? If not, how should it be accounted for in the bonus 
contract?   
 
The corporate tax rate has declined considerable over time, which has had a positive 
effect on earnings. Management has no control over the development in corporate tax 
rates questioning the wisdom of measuring performance on an after tax basis.   
 
EVA (Economic Value Added) 
In its pure form, EVA seems to be the ideal performance measure. Economic profit 
(economic value added) is not obtained until all capital providers have been 
compensated. However, EVA is prone to accounting distortion. In fact, the EVA 
literature recommends a host of accounting adjustments before calculating EVA. To 
avoid this tedious task, bonus may alternatively be based on the change in EVA from 
year to year. In this case, a low (high) initial invested capital due to, say, conservative 
(aggressive) accounting initially produces high (low) EVA figures. A positive change in 
EVA, thus, requires a higher future level of EVA.     
 
Even though EVA from a theoretical point of view has its merits as a measure of a firm’s 
value creation (economic profit), it’s not a perfect measure. For instance, it does not take 
the horizon problem (single vs. multiple period performance measures) into consideration 
in the sense that it only considers the effects of transactions on current year’s financial 
statements. Restructuring costs, for example, has a negative effect on current years EVA 
even though future periods EVA may improve (NPV positive). In fact, the findings in the 
extant EVA literature question if EVA is a better measure of value creation than (various) 
earnings figures. For instance, Biddle et al. (1996) find that on average EVA does not 
dominate earnings as a performance measure. 
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5. Relation between performance and bonus  
 
An open question in designing bonus contracts is how bonus should be tied to 
performance. The following represents likely candidates: 
 
• Linearity between performance and bonus  
• Lump sum bonus  
• A minimum and a maximum bonus (floors-caps) 
 
At first glance, linearity seems to be the proper way to link bonus to performance. The 
better the performance (in whatever way it’s measured), the higher the awarded 
compensation. However, without a lower and upper limit for the size of the bonus, 
linearity between bonus and performance raises some concern. Compensation committees 
must consider issues like: Is it reasonable that compensation may be exorbitant if 
performance is excellent? What if the performance is excellent, but the main competitors 
are performing even better? What if the company has negative earnings? Does this imply 
that bonus should be negative? In this case should executives pay cash to the firm or 
should the negative bonus be off-set against future positive bonuses (bonus bank)? 
 
Alternatively, bonus may be paid out as a lump sum, if management are able to perform 
as stipulated in the bonus contract. It is critical in this respect that if executives during the 
year find it hard to reach target, they may not be motivated to work in the best interest of 
the company’s owners. Moreover, if they have already met the target before year end, 
they may not be motivated to work as hard in the remaining part of the (fiscal) year. 
  
A final possibility is to limit bonus to a certain range (floor and caps). In between the 
minimum and maximum bonus, the correlation between performance and bonus is linear. 
An issue in this respect, that is not easy to overcome, is the likelihood that executives 
may engage in earnings management. For instance, if performance is below the floor 
(e.g., earnings below minimum requirement as set forth in the bonus contract), 
management may be tempted to take ‘a big bath’ (make too large provisions for 
restructuring, depreciate and amortize assets too quickly etc. in order to improve future 
profitability). Research document that floors and caps on bonus contracts provide 
incentives to shift reported earnings between periods (Healy, 1985). 
 
 
6. Performance standards (bonus threshold) 
 
As discussed above, bonus should be linked to performance. A related issue is what the 
various performance measures should be benchmarked against. Murphy (2001) argues 
that bonuses in practice are based on performance measured relative to a performance 
standard. Arguably, a high level of, say, turnover or EBIT does not in itself suggest that 
value is created neither in the short term nor in the long term. For performance measures 
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to be useful there must be a standard of comparison. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue 
that reasonable, objective ways to set performance standards are: Past performance, 
determination of how difficult it is to carry out particular operations, for example 
required return on capital (benchmarking) and performance of executives in comparable 
firms or industries (peer-groups). Based on Milgrom and Roberts (1992) relevant basis 
for comparison includes:  
 
• Past performance (e.g., net earnings) 
• Benchmarks (e.g., WACC) 
• Peer groups (comparable firms) 
 
From a pure criterion of costs associated with measuring performance, standards based 
on past performance should be preferred since historical performance data are easily 
available (Murphy, 2001).   
 
Benchmarking includes for example comparing return on invested capital (ROIC) to the 
cost of capital (WACC) or return on equity (ROE) to investors required return on equity 
capital (re). This is basically equivalent to using EVA as a performance measure, and 
introduces the same issues (benefits and pitfalls). 
 
A third way of comparison includes benchmarking against competitors, for instance 
comparing ROIC with the average ROIC from firms in the peer group. A benefit of this 
comparison is that macro economic factors are ‘evened out’. If ROIC, for example, is at 
an all time high due to an economic upturn, competitors are also likely to perform 
exceptionally well effectively limiting the size of bonus. On the other hand, it may be 
difficult to find a peer-group, since these firms should be comparable in respect to risk 
and accounting practices. 
 
While not included by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), comparing performance to an 
approved budget seems to be a possible performance standard. For instance, if market 
penetration is high on the agenda, turnover may be the relevant performance measure. A 
gauge for turnover could be the approved budget effectively linking bonus to growth in 
turnover. Likewise, EBIT or other earnings measures could be linked to budget. A pitfall 
in this regard is that the budget may be overly pessimistic, as it is prepared by 
management, who might be tempted to prepare a budget that is easy to fulfil. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In designing bonus contracts the parties involved should pay close attention to the choice 
of performance measure(s), accounting issues, the link between performance and bonus, 
and performance standards. While we discuss design issues in preparing bonus contracts, 
we do not provide clear-cut answers as how to control for all these issues. In fact, we 
raise a number of questions that bonus committees at a minimum should consider in 
writing bonus contracts. We hope that a thorough discussion of those issues prior to 
writing bonus contracts may prevent intense interpretation discussions once the contract 
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has been issued. It all adds up to establishing a bonus contract that aligns the interest of 
management and owners.  
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1 Even if a firm is not listed on a stock exchange, stock options may be used for compensation purposes. 
This requires that firm value is estimated on a regular basis as a proxy for what the market price would 
have been. This raises a variety of issues as discussed in Petersen et al. (2006).  
2 Greens Analyseinstitut is a large institution that conduct political and marked analysis. 
3 Average illustrates the extent to which each single measure is used to gauge the size of compensation. For 
example, if compensation is based on ‘contribution margin’ this performance measure has a weight of 48% 
in calculating (the potential) bonus. 
4 Except for changing recognition criteria from, say, point-of-sale to production criteria. 
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